This paper considers the greening policies in a decentralized channel between one manufacturer and one retailer in a fuzzy decision making environment. We consider the manufacturing cost and the parameters of demand function as the fuzzy variables. Based on the different market structures, we develop three different fuzzy decentralized decision models. For each case, the expected value, optimistic value and pessimistic value models are formulated, and their optimal solutions are also derived through the fuzzy set theory. Finally, three numerical examples are solved to examine the effectiveness of fuzzy models. The effects of the confidence level of the supply chain member's profits and the fuzziness of parameters on optimal prices, level of green innovation, and fuzzy expected profits of actors are also analyzed.
Introduction
In a traditional supply chain, chain members usually focus on their total costs and profits, and ignore their operations impacted on environment. This phenomenon is altering rapidly as the problems of environment are affecting the population's living conditions of the world more severely. With the development of the green economy and low-carbon economy, more and more scholars and market administrators have applied the green principles and techniques to develop and solve the green supply chain (GSC) management problems.
Recently, some studies have been done on analyzing the game theoretic models in GSC management. Sheu 1 considered the nuclear power generation problem by using a multi-objective optimization programming approach in GSC management. Using the method of asymmetrical Nash bargaining game and backward induction, Sheu 2 analyzed the negotiations problem with government intervention between the GSC members. Ghosh and Shah 3 developed a game theoretic model for analyzing the influence of channel structures on greening levels, prices and profits in both cooperation and noncooperation situations. Ghosh and Shan 4 also discussed the coordination issues of GMC by using the cost sharing contract. By using evolutionary dynamics, Barari et al. 5 framed integrated and holistic conceptual framework on maximizing the total supply chain's profits that took the practical aspects into account in a GSC. Swami and Shah 6 established a two-part tariff contract for coordinating GSC, where the models contained price and non-price variables. Similar issues was studied by Swami and Shah 7 , they studied the coordination mechanism of GSC that took the shelf-space allocation of products into the pricing competitive strategies in which one manufacturer sold his substitutable products to two competing retailers with fuzzy costs and demands. Zhao et al. 18 also studied pricing competition problems with two manufacturers under fuzzy demand environments. Wei and Zhao 19 discussed the problems of pricing decisions in a reverse channel. Zhao and Wang 20 studied service and price competition problem with two competitive retailers in a distribution system with fuzzy demand. Yu et al. 21 developed fuzzy newsboy models to obtain the optimal prices between the supplier and the retailer. Recently, Sang 22 investigated the coordination mechanism in a multiple supply chain with fuzzy demands and costs. Chang and Yeh 23 analyzed the decentralized and the centralized supply chain system with fuzzy demand under a return policy, and showed that the fuzziness of demand affected the optimal results of the supply chain members. Khamseh et al. 24 proposed
four different pricing models of complementary products with two competing manufacturers in fuzzy environments. Sang 25 proposed one expected value model and two chance-constrained programming models between two competing manufacturers and one common retailer under fuzzy uncertainty.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no work that deals with the optimal decisions of GSC in a fuzzy decision environment. Therefore, in this paper, we will examine how the retailer and the manufacturer should make their own pricing and green level decisions in a fuzzy decision environment. We also explore the impacts of the confidence level and the fuzzy degree of parameters on the equilibrium prices, green level and profits of the supply chain members.
The paper makes three contributions to the extant literature. Firstly, our proposed models extend the study of Ghosh and Shah 3 by considering the greening policies under fuzzy uncertainty. The manufacturing costs and market demand are all fuzzy. Secondly, we apply the different ranking measures of fuzzy variables to reflect the attitudes of the participants. They can choose the expected values model to derive their optimal decisions if they are risk neutral. They can choose the optimistic values model to derive their optimal decisions if they are risk preferable. And they can choose the pessimistic values model to derive their optimal decisions if they are risk averse. Thirdly, compared to the method used in conventional environment, our work has some main findings: the profit margin, wholesale price, retail price and level of green innovation are higher, while the manufacturer's profit is lower, and the retailer's profit and supply chain system's profit are higher under fuzzy uncertainly. The rest of this paper is as follows. Firstly, some useful concepts and propositions about fuzzy set theory are presented in Section 2. Section 3 introduces the notations of the models. Three fuzzy green supply chain models are proposed in Section 4. In Section 5, three numerical examples are given to elucidate the solutions of each model. Section 6 summarizes the work.
Preliminaries
The possibility measure Pos was introduced by Nahmias 26 and three axioms were given:
( ) Pos 0 φ = , for the empty set φ .
Axiom 3.
( ) 27 and Zhao et al.
Lemma 1 (Liu and Liu

28
). Let ξ and η be positive independent fuzzy variables. Then, for 
Problem Descriptions
Consider a GSC with a manufacturer and a retailer, where the retailer orders greening products from the manufacturer, and then he retails them to end customers. The manufacturer is assumed to produce only one product and the retailer sells only single product.
Similar to Ghosh and Shah 3 , the market demand function faced by the manufacturer and the retailer is considered as a linear form of the retail price p and the level of greening innovation θ , the market demand is q D p
where the fuzzy parameter D  denotes the market potential, the fuzzy parameter β  denotes the retail price sensitivity of the customer, and the fuzzy parameter γ denotes the greening innovation sensitivity of the manufacturer to the demand. The fuzzy parameters D  , β  and γ are positive and mutually independent. Further, let w denote the unit wholesale price of greening product, c  the unit fuzzy producing cost of greening product for the manufacturer and m the unit margin profit of product for the retailer. As the retail price p is the sum of margin profit m and wholesale price w , we consider retail price as p m w = + . The fuzzy demand function of the greening product is presented as follows
It is assumed that the marginal cost of the manufacturer is not affected by the greening innovation. In addition, for achieving greening innovation, it needs fixed investment. The cost of the fixed investment is assumed as a quadratic function of the parameter θ , and is expressed as 
where Pos is a possibility measure. The order quantity of the greening product can be presented as
The fuzzy profit functions of the manufacturer and the retailer can be derived as
Model Analysis
In this section, we will discuss the operations of the supply chain participants in a GSC, and examine the manufacturer and the retailer how to set their optimal policies with different power structures under fuzzy uncertainty. We study the equilibrium decisions under three non-cooperative games in the decentralized channel: the manufacturer dominates the channel (Manufacturer-Stackelberg game), the retailer leads the International Journal of Computational Intelligence Systems, Vol. 10 (2017) 986-1001 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ channel (Retailer-Stackelberg game), and the supply chain participants have an equal bargaining power (Vertical-Nash game).
Manufacturer Stackelberg (MS) game
In the MS game, the retailer has less bargaining power than the manufacturer. That is to say, the manufacturer is the leader in the GSC. Firstly, the manufacturer sets his wholesale price w and level of greening innovation θ condition on the retailer's optimal reaction to his decisions. Then, the retailer sets is own margin profit m . Hence, in this case, we can formulate the fuzzy optimal model as follows ( )
Substituting m in Eq. (6) 29, 30 , has a big role in formulating fuzzy models. Given a confidence level α, the decision makers try to optimize the critical value subject to chance constraint. Hence, in this case, we can formulate the maximax chance-constrained programming model as follows 
Proof. The retailer's profit is
The first order condition
The second order condition
= , we can get the retailer's optimal margin profit as in Eq. (14) .
Theorem 3 is proved.
then the optimal equilibrium decisions are
Proof. The manufacturer's profit is
Substituting ( ) * , m w θ in Eq. (14) into Eq. (19), the first order conditions can be obtained as
( )
Therefore, the Hessian matrix of ( )
Since β  , I  are positive fuzzy variables and 
□
The optimal optimistic profits of the manufacturer and the retailer can be easily obtained as follows
Similarly, in the MS game, we can formulate the minimax chance-constrained programming model of GSC as follows 
. (20) where α is a given confidence level for manufacturer's and retailer's profits, R Π is the maximum value that 
Proof. Similar to Theorems 3 and 4.
The optimal pessimistic profits of the manufacturer and the retailer are given by 
Retailer Stackelberg (RS) game
In the RS game, the manufacturer has more bargaining power than the retailer. That is to say, the retailer is the leader in the GSC. In this case, firstly, the retailer sets his margin profit m condition on the manufacturer's optimal reaction to his decisions. Then, the manufacturer sets his wholesale price w and level of greening innovation θ . Hence, in this case, we can formulate the fuzzy optimal model as follows ( 
We first solve the reaction function of the manufacturer. 
Proof. From Eq. (11), the first order conditions can be obtained as
Therefore the Hessian matrix 
4 4
Proof. Substituting Eqs. (26) and (27) into Eq. (7), the first order condition is
, then the second order condition is negative definite.
Let the first order conditions be zero, we can have Eq. (28) . Substituting ** m in Eq. (28) into Eqs. (26) and (27), we can get Eqs. (29) and (30) . Theorem 7 is proved.
□
In the RS game, the maximax chance-constrained programming model of GSC can be formulated as ( ) 
Proof. From Eq. (19), the first order conditions can be obtained as
Therefore, the Hessian matrix of 
The second order condition is 
In the RS game, the minimax chance-constrained programming model of GSC can be formulate as follows ( ) 
Proof. Similar to Theorems 8 and 9.
The optimal pessimistic profits for the supply chain members are given by 
Vertical Nash (VN) game
In the VN game, the supply chain participants have an equal bargaining power. Thus, in this condition, the manufacturer makes his wholesale price w and level of greening innovation θ , and the retailer makes his margin profit m simultaneously and independently. The assumption VN game means a Nash equilibrium among the manufacturer and the retailer, hence, in this case, we can formulate the fuzzy optimal model as follows 
(44) Proof. From Eq. (7), the first order condition is
The second order condition is
Thus, the retailer's fuzzy expected profit
From Eq. (11), the first order conditions are
Therefore, the Hessian matrix We can have Eqs. (42), (43) and (44) by setting the first order conditions above be zero. Theorem 11 is proved.
□
In the VN game, we can also formulate the minimax chance-constrained programming model of GSC as ( ) 
Proof. From Eq. (15), the first order condition is
The second order condition is ( ) 
Therefore, the Hessian matrix of
Since β  , I  are positive fuzzy variables and We can have Eqs. (46) , (47) and (48) by setting the first order conditions above be zero. Theorem 12 is proved.
In the VN game, the minimax chance-constrained programming model of GSC can be formulated as follows 
Proof. Similar to Theorem 12.
The optimal pessimistic profits of the manufacturer and the retailer can be obtained as follows 
Numerical Examples
Because the optimal equilibrium decisions obtained in above Section are in very complicated forms, we have to conduct numerical examples to illustrate the computational process of fuzzy models proposed in this paper. We will also perform the impacts of the fuzziness of parameters β  , γ and the confidence level α on these models. Consider the case where the retailer orders new greening household appliances from the manufacturer, and then he retails them to the end customers. The data used in the numerical examples are estimated from the Chinese household appliances manufacturing industry. These data have been properly handled before being adopted. We think these data can represent the real condition duce to lack of historical data when supply chain participants make their optimal decisions.
The linguistic descriptions and its corresponding triangular fuzzy variables determined by the experiences of experts are shown in Table 1 . 
The results of the optimal expected solutions under three non-cooperative games are showed in Tables 3 and  4 . From Tables 3 and 4 , we can find that
(1)The optimal green innovation's level θ is the highest in the VN case when the actors have equal bargaining power. The MS case provides the lowest level of green innovation this is because under this case the full costs of greening are afforded by manufacturer.
(2)The wholesale price w under the MS case is the highest, followed by VN and then RS cases, this is because that the manufacturer incurs green costs and has the dominant power in pricing of the green product. The profit margin of the retailer m is highest in the RS case this is because in this case manufacturer charges a low wholesale price w . Under MS case, The retail price p is the highest, followed by RS and then VN cases.
(3)The retailer makes the smallest profit under MS case, and the largest under RS case. On the other hand, the manufacturer's fuzzy expected profits are in the reverse order. It shows that the more power the actor has the more fuzzy expected profits he can derive. That is, the retailer's fuzzy expected profit is the largest when the retailer is the leader, and the manufacturer's largest when the manufacturer is the leader in the channel.
(4)The integrated system obtains his largest expected profit in the VN case when no actor is a channel leader. However, the manufacturer or the retailer has an incentive to be a leader this is because as a leader he can obtain more fuzzy expected profit.
(5) Under VN case, the retail price p is the lowest, and the level of green innovation θ is highest. For the customers, this means VN case is a preferred policy.
Discussion 2
In this subsection, we discuss the impacts of the fuzziness of parameters β  and γ on prices, level of green innovation and expected profits under MS, RS and VN cases.
Decreasing the fuzzy degree of the parameters β  , γ and observing their impacts. We use the same values of other parameters as in Discussion 1. Tables 5, 6 , 7 and 8 give the solutions as follows. 
Discussion 3
Thirdly, we present the results of the α-optimistic values and α-pessimistic values under three decentralized channel decisions shown in Tables 9, 10 , 11 and 12, respectively. In Tables 9, 10 , 11 and 12, the 2th, 8th and 14th rows show the optimal equilibrium decisions under three cases in crisp environment at α=1. From Tables 9, 10 , 11 and 12, we can find that (9) In the three different fuzzy models, the α-optimistic values of profit margin, prices, level of green innovation and profits for supply chain participants increase, as the confidence level α decreases. That is to say, if the confidence level of the supply chain participant's profits α=1, then the supply chain participants derive their smallest profits. It means that the less responsible of supply chain participants to risk, the lower profits will be when they are risk preferable.
(10) In the three different fuzzy models, the α-pessimistic values of profit margin, prices, greening level and profits for supply chain actors increase, as the confidence level α increases. That is to say, if the confidence level of the supply chain participant's profits α=1, then the supply chain participants derive their largest profits. It means that the more responsible of supply chain participants to risk, the larger profits will be when they are risk averse.
In practice, the supply chain participants can alter the value of the parameter α to obtain the different equilibrium decisions under the different level of the supply chain participant's profits. The equilibrium decision reflects the different risk attitude of the supply chain participant to market demand uncertainty and different prediction of possibility level.
(11) It is interesting to compare the solutions of this paper with the work of Ghosh and Shah 3 . When α=1, the solutions in this study will be the conventional solutions according to the method of Ghosh and Shah 3 . In Tables9, 10, 11 and 12, the 2th, 8th and 14th rows show the optimal equilibrium decisions under three cases in crisp environment. Compared these optimal equilibrium decisions in crisp environment to those in fuzzy decision making environment showed in Table 3 , we observe that our profit margin, wholesale price, retail price and level of green innovation are all higher than those in crisp results. The manufacturer's profit is lower, while the retailer's profit and supply chain system's profit are higher when they face fuzzy uncertainty. It means that the retailer could benefit from the fuzzy environment, while the manufacturer could suffer from this environment.
Conclusions
This paper deals with the coordination strategy in a m In this paper, we considered three different fuzzy models in green supply chain, in which supply chain participants pursued three different power balance scenarios. For each model, we provided the optimal equilibrium decisions of the manufacturer and the retailer when they were risk neutral, risk preferable and risk averse. We also found that under certain circumstances, the formulated fuzzy supply chain models can degenerate into crisp models. Besides, we show that the different power structures, the confidence level of the supply chain participant's profits and fuzzy degree of parameters affect the final optimal solutions. The current fuzzy green supply chain models have some limitations. The fuzzy demand for supply chain is assumed as a linear function. Another limitation is that we only consider one manufacturer and one retailer in GSC. Further research can focus on analyzing some more complicated greening policies in which some other kinds of demand functions or multiple supply chain participants exist. Still, we will develop the channel coordination in GSC under a fuzzy decision environment.
